Water Law Review
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 55

1-1-2000

Huber v. Oliver County, 602 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1999)
Julie E. Hultgren

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Julie E. Hultgren, Court Report, Huber v. Oliver County, 602 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1999), 3 U. Denv. Water L.
Rev. 475 (2000).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

caused by the dam. Ultimately, the claimant conceded that the water rights
were severed from the north side property and the court concluded that
claimant failed to produce any sufficient evidence to rebut the facts asserted
in the certified title abstract. Therefore, the claimant was not entitled to
any compensation for water rights.
Anna Litaker
NORTH DAKOTA
Huber v. Oliver County, 602 N.W.2d 710 (N.D. 1999) (holding that: (1)
landowners were not entitled to a new trial for damages and injunctive
relief for flood damage to farm land as the jury was properly instructed
concerning the "Act-of-God" defense; (2) Oliver County ("County") met
its duty to maintain the natural course of Otter Creek when constructing a
road and was not required to construct road to avoid all possible damage;
and (3) damages were properly awarded to the County).
The Huber family ("Hubers") owned a farm where they raised crops
and livestock. Otter Creek ("Creek") meandered on and off the land
providing irrigation for forty acres along the creek and water for the
livestock. In the 1950's, Oliver County ("County") voters approved the
construction of a federal-aid "farm-to-market road" on the land. In 1961,
the Hubers contracted with the County for a provisional qualified easement
across the land to build the road. By building the road across the Huber
farm, the County would save money by crossing the Creek only twice at
either end of a small oxbow in the Creek. The contract required that the
County construct two culverts and a concrete barrier to maintain normal
flows of water along the oxbow. The contract also specified that the
County would pay for the cost of constructing an additional structure to
maintain the natural course of the Creek's flow in the event the culverts
and barrier failed to achieve the purpose.
The County constructed the road with the two culverts and barrier.
The system soon failed despite additional County efforts to maintain the
Creek flows. The Hubers sued the County in 1989 for breach of the 1961
easement contract seeking damages and specific performance. The trial
court denied specific performance and granted summary judgment
dismissing the breach of contract claim as barred by the statute of
limitations. In 1995, the supreme court affirmed the denial of specific
performance, but reversed and remanded for trial concerning the statute of
limitations issue.
After the Hubers experienced flood problems in 1993 after a heavy
summer rain and in 1996 after a heavy spring runoff, the Hubers sued the
County in 1996 alleging that the County's insufficient culvert system failed
to prevent the 1993 and 1996 flood damage. The Hubers sought damages
and injunctive relief to require the County to install additional culverts to
prevent future flood damage.
The 1989 and 1996 actions were consolidated into one trial. The lower
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court dismissed the 1989 lawsuit as barred by the statute of limitations.
The Hubers tried the 1996 claims for injunctive relief and damages. Prior
to trial the County agreed to build another nine-foot culvert which doubled
the amount of culvert capacity in order to alleviate future flood damage.
The jury found that the County's road construction or culvert and barrier
system did not cause the flooding on the Hubers' land, which barred a
damages award. In addition, the trial court denied injunctive relief stating
that the Hubers had "an adequate remedy at law, and a multiplicity of suits
would be necessary to address their claims . . . ." The Hubers moved for
a new trial on the 1996 claims challenging the jury instruction on the
County's "Act-of-God" defense, the denial of injunctive relief, and the
taxation of costs and disbursements against them. The trial court denied
the post-trial motions and the Hubers appealed.
The issues on appeal were: (1) whether the trial court's jury instruction
concerning the County's Act-of-God defense adequately informed the jury
of the applicable law; (2) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant
the Hubers' request for injunctive relief requiring the County to construct
more than one additional culvert; and (3) whether the trial court erred in
awarding the County $8,230.96 for its costs and disbursements.
The supreme court first considered whether the trial court's jury
instruction adequately informed the jury of the applicable law concerning
the County's Act-of-God defense. The Hubers argued that they were
entitled to a new trial because the trial court's jury instruction failed to
specify that to prevail, the County needed to establish that the Act-of-God
was the sole proximate cause of damage to the land to avoid liability. The
Hubers argued that they presented evidence indicating the County's
negligence. Reviewing the jury instruction as a whole, the court found that
the jury instruction language requiring the rainfalls to be of such magnitude
that the Hubers' damages "would have been suffered . . . regardless of any
acts of Oliver County" was synonymous with specifically stating that the
Act-of-God must have been the sole proximate cause of the Hubers'
damages.
Thus, the court held that the jury instruction adequately
informed the jury of the applicable law.
The supreme court next considered whether the trial court erred in
refusing to grant the Hubers' request for injunctive relief requiring the
County to build more than one additional culvert to alleviate future flood
damage.
The Hubers argued that the relevant highway construction
statutes imposed an absolute duty upon the County to prevent flow
obstruction of the Creek and provide drainage necessary to avoid flooding
on their land. The court recognized that it previously interpreted the
statutes to impose a mandatory duty to construct roads not to obstruct the
natural flow and drainage of the surface waters. However, the court
rejected the Hubers' argument that the statutes required that the County
construct a culvert to withstand any type of flood event including an Actof-God holding that statutes are not interpreted to produce absurd or
ludicrous results. Instead, the court interpreted the statutes to impose a
duty upon the County to maintain the natural flow and drainage of the
Creek to the extent required by engineering standards and prudent and
sound engineering design practices. The court held that the County's
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construction met the applicable North Dakota Department of
Transportation's twenty-five year flood event design standards. The court
concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to
grant injunctive relief to the Hubers.
Finally, the supreme court considered whether the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding the County costs and disbursements under the North
Dakota statute granting such awards to prevailing parties. The Hubers
argued that they were the prevailing party under the statute because of the
County's pretrial agreement to build an additional culvert. The court
rejected the Hubers' argument finding the County was the prevailing party
in the case. The court also rejected Hubers' argument that the costs were
not properly detailed and verified as required by the North Dakota rules of
civil procedure. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in rejecting Hubers' argument that the County inappropriately
taxed the costs of its expert engineer because the engineer changed his
position before trial which increased the litigation costs.
In conclusion, the court held that the trial court did not err in denying
the Hubers' motion for a new trial and affirmed both the judgment and the
post-judgment orders.
Julie E. Hultgren
OHIO
Friends of Ottawa River v. Schregardus, No. 98AP-1314, 1999 Ohio
App. LEXIS 4236 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 16, 1999) (upholding issuance of
a section 401 Water Quality Certification to City of Toledo, Ohio, where
appellants claimed they had submitted an incomplete application and had
made alterations to the original plan).
Friends of Ottawa River ("Friends") appealed the Ohio Environmental
Review Appeals Commission's ("ERAC") decision to uphold issuance of a
section 401 Water Quality Certification to City of Toledo, Ohio ("Toledo")
by the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency ("OEPA"). Toledo agreed
to remediate several parcels of real estate to prepare for Chrysler's
expansion of a Jeep production plant ("Jeep project"), thereby making
Toledo responsible for the appropriate permits.
Toledo applied to the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("COE")
for a section 404 permit to fill roughly twenty-five acres of wetlands
surrounding the facility, including 5.34 acres adjacent to the Ottawa River.
The Clean Water Act required section 401 certification as a prerequisite to
a section 404 permit. Under Ohio law, a section 404 permit application
with COE simultaneously effects application for section 401 certification
from OEPA. Toledo filed supporting documentation as required.
After the notice and comment period, OEPA issued section 401
certification for the Jeep project to Toledo. Shortly thereafter, Friends
argued the certification invalid for two reasons: (1) incompleteness of the
application; and (2) a change of the planned uses after the public

